- (Topic 3)
Which of the following is the BEST way to detect software license violations?
Correct Answer:D
The best way to prevent and detect software license violations is to regularly scan used PCs, either from the LAN or directly, to ensure that unauthorized copies of software have not been loaded on the PC.
Other options are not detective.
A corporate policy is not necessarily enforced and followed by all employees.
Software can be installed from other means than floppies or CD-ROMs (from a LAN or even downloaded from the Internet) and software metering only concerns applications that are registered.
Source: Information Systems Audit and Control Association, Certified Information Systems Auditor 2002 review manual, Chapter 3: Technical Infrastructure and Operational Practices (page 108).
- (Topic 5)
What kind of encryption is realized in the S/MIME-standard?
Correct Answer:C
S/MIME (for Secure MIME, or Secure Multipurpose Mail Extension) is a security process used for e-mail exchanges that makes it possible to guarantee the confidentiality and non-repudiation of electronic messages.
S/MIME is based on the MIME standard, the goal of which is to let users attach files other than ASCII text files to electronic messages. The MIME standard therefore makes it possible to attach all types of files to e-mails.
S/MIME was originally developed by the company RSA Data Security. Ratified in July 1999 by the IETF, S/MIME has become a standard, whose specifications are contained in RFCs 2630 to 2633.
How S/MIME works
The S/MIME standard is based on the principle of public-key encryption. S/MIME therefore makes it possible to encrypt the content of messages but does not encrypt the communication.
The various sections of an electronic message, encoded according to the MIME standard, are each encrypted using a session key.
The session key is inserted in each section's header, and is encrypted using the recipient's public key. Only the recipient can open the message's body, using his private key, which guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of the received message.
In addition, the message's signature is encrypted with the sender's private key. Anyone intercepting the communication can read the content of the message's signature, but this ensures the recipient of the sender's identity, since only the sender is capable of encrypting a message (with his private key) that can be decrypted with his public key.
Reference(s) used for this question: http://en.kioskea.net/contents/139-cryptography-s-mime
RFC 2630: Cryptographic Message Syntax;
OPPLIGER, Rolf, Secure Messaging with PGP and S/MIME, 2000, Artech House; HARRIS, Shon, All-In-One CISSP Certification Exam Guide, 2001, McGraw-Hill/Osborne, page 570;
SMITH, Richard E., Internet Cryptography, 1997, Addison-Wesley Pub Co.
- (Topic 4)
In the course of responding to and handling an incident, you work on determining the root cause of the incident. In which step are you in?
Correct Answer:D
In this step, your main objective is to examine and analyze what has occurred and focus on determining the root cause of the incident.
Recovery is incorrect as recovery is about resuming operations or bringing affected systems back into production
Containment is incorrect as containment is about reducing the potential impact of an incident.
Triage is incorrect as triage is about determining the seriousness of the incident and filtering out false positives
Reference:
Official Guide to the CISSP CBK, pages 700-704
- (Topic 4)
To understand the 'whys' in crime, many times it is necessary to understand MOM. Which of the following is not a component of MOM?
Correct Answer:B
To understand the whys in crime, many times it is necessary to understand the Motivations, Opportunities, and Means (MOM). Motivations are the who and why of a crime. Opportunities are the where and when of a crime, and Means pertains to the capabilities a criminal would need to be successful. Methods is not a component of MOM.
- (Topic 1)
Which of the following is not a logical control when implementing logical access security?
Correct Answer:C
Employee badges are considered Physical so would not be a logical control. The following answers are incorrect:
userids. Is incorrect because userids are a type of logical control.
access profiles. Is incorrect because access profiles are a type of logical control. passwords. Is incorrect because passwords are a type of logical control.
- (Topic 1)
The Orange Book is founded upon which security policy model?
Correct Answer:B
From the glossary of Computer Security Basics:
The Bell-LaPadula model is the security policy model on which the Orange Book requirements are based. From the Orange Book definition, "A formal state transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules. In this formal model, the entities in a computer system are divided into abstract sets of subjects and objects. The notion of secure state is defined and it is proven that each state transition preserves security by moving from secure state to secure state; thus, inductively proving the system is secure. A system state is defined to be 'secure' if the only permitted access modes of subjects to objects are in accordance with a specific security policy. In order to determine whether or not a specific access mode is allowed, the clearance of a subject is compared to the classification of the object and a determination is made as to whether the subject is authorized for the specific access mode."
The Biba Model is an integrity model of computer security policy that describes a set of rules. In this model, a subject may not depend on any object or other subject that is less trusted than itself.
The Clark Wilson Model is an integrity model for computer security policy designed for a commercial environment. It addresses such concepts as nondiscretionary access control, privilege separation, and least privilege. TEMPEST is a government program that prevents the compromising electrical and electromagnetic signals that emanate from computers and related equipment from being intercepted and deciphered.
Source: RUSSEL, Deborah & GANGEMI, G.T. Sr., Computer Security Basics, O'Reilly, 1991.
Also: U.S. Department of Defense, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book), DOD 5200.28-STD. December 1985 (also available here).